Should we represent the experienced present in Minkowski spacetime?

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In recent times, and following Stein's original suggestion (Stein 1991), attempts have been made to show that the passage of time and the block view are wholly compatible (Arthur 2005, Dieks 2005, Dorato 2002, Savitt 2002). Recently, Arthur (2005) and Savitt (2007) in particular have argued that a well-defined geometric structure, that they call *Alexandroff present* − obtained by taking any closed interval on a worldline and having the past light cone centered in the end point of the interval and the future light cone centered on the beginning point of the interval intersect − can faithfully represent most of the features of what we call "present". While agreeing on the overall compatibility of becoming (or passage) with the the structure of Minkoski spacetime, I take issue with the fact that the Alexandroff present is an adequate representor of the present of our experience.

On the one hand, one could question that the compatibility claim really needs to rely on a particular geometric structure as *the* structure of the experience present: after all, Minkowski spacetime was suggested as a the geometric underpinning of a *physical* theory. Considering the difficulties of physicalistic interpretations of the body-mind problem, why saddle Minkowski spacetime with a task that it might not be able to fulfill?[1] On the other hand, if one really insisted to try to represent the experienced present in the structure of Minkowski spacetime, psycho-physiological data on the duration of the present suggest to replace the Alexandroff's diamonds with a different, wedge-like structure.

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[1] The fact that certain *physical* systems to a given approximation exemplify the structure of Minkowski spacetime does not guarantee that also psychological system should obey the constraints of that structure.